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Abstract
We give an account of an overlapping-generations experiment with multiple families in which
voluntary transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to children. Support to
the old is a purely intergenerational (intra-family) transfer, whereas grants to children also
involve an element of intra-generational (inter-family) redistribution through a compulsory
pension system. Our data show that higher compulsory inter-family transfers lead subjects to
place relatively more emphasis on support instead of grants: grants are crowded out, but
support is not signiﬁcantly affected. The efﬁciency of voluntary transfers increases, however.
Furthermore, if subjects give transfers, they do not use tokens of direct reciprocity; evidence
of indirect reciprocity in transfer behavior can only be obtained for the case where compulsory
transfers are high.
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Voluntary transfers between parents and children are a major factor in the
allocation of income and wealth. Parents invest time and money in raising
their children, and they help them with gifts, college tuition and grants.
According to Kotlikoff (1988), intergenerational transfers from parents to
adult children are estimated to involve as much as 80 percent of total assets
in the U.S. of which about 50 percent are inter vivos; see Gale and Scholz
(1994). Children, on the other hand, not only spend time and energy in
attention and care of their parents, they also provide them with old age
support. For example, McGarry and Schoeni (1995) use data from the Health
and Retirement Study to observe that 7.1 percent of adult children make
ﬁnancial transfers to their parents.
The explanation for these voluntary transfers is not a well-established
matter. Two types of explanations stand out. One type relies on altruism that
arises from kinship; see Becker (1974). You are kind to your kin, because
you care about their well-being. The other explanation relies on some form
of quid pro quo or reciprocity. You are kind to your parents in reaction to
their kindness. In this case, contrary to altruism, transfers are of a condi-
tional nature, as in Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985), Cigno (1993),
Cox (1987) and Hammond (1975). Such conditionality, however, can come
in different shapes. One is direct reciprocity, according to which you are kind
to your parents in relation to how kind they are to you. Another is indirect
reciprocity, according to which you are kind to your parents in response to
how kind they have been to their parents.
Understanding the motives behind voluntary intergenerational transfers is
important as different motives may imply different responses to public
transfers. If transfers are motivated by altruism, an increase in tax-ﬁnanced
old age transfers will crowd out private transfers to parents dollar-for-dollar
because of the Ricardian-equivalence effect. For the same reason, transfers
from parents to children will increase in order to compensate for the income
effect of public transfers. If, however, transfers are motivated by a reciprocity
motive, the effects of an increase in tax-ﬁnanced old age transfers are not so
clear. One possibility is that the level of voluntary transfers will decrease
(though typically not dollar-for-dollar). Since the elderly receive a public
pension there is less need for private old age support from children. To the
extent that parents in their old age still require support from their children,
however, engendering the same level of support through reciprocity may
require a higher level of transfers from parent to child if a larger part of the
latter transfers is taxed.
The degree to which crowding out occurs is difﬁcult to investigate due to
lack of adequate data. In one of the few empirical studies, Ku ¨nnemund and
Rein (1999) found little support for crowding out of transfers from children
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motive for voluntary transfers. Although based on only one study, this
conclusion would be in line with several other empirical studies which have
tested and rejected other predictions of the altruism model; see e.g. Altonji,
Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1997), Cigno, Gianelli and Rosati (1998) and Cox
and Rank (1992).
Here, we examine crowding out in an experimental setting; see also
Bolton and Katok (1998) and Cadsby and Frank (1990). One advantage is
that experiments provide detailed information on individual behavior and
make it possible to isolate the effect of a key variable, in this case the
expansion of tax-ﬁnanced old age support. Furthermore, since the experi-
ments were conducted with students as subjects, altruistic motives derived
from kinship will be minimal. Although the presence of altruism can still not
be excluded, voluntary transfers in the laboratory are more likely to derive
from reciprocity. We can thus gain a better understanding of the behavioral
regularities of reciprocity-motivated transfers.
We implemented an experimental design with two ‘‘families’’ coexisting
at the same time in which every subject has one ‘‘child’’ and one ‘‘parent’’.
Intertemporal consumption smoothing cannot be achieved by savings. In-
stead, the experimental subjects were supplied with two instruments. One
instrument, called support, involves an intra-family intergenerational transfer
from child to parent. The other instrument, called grant, involves a transfer
in the opposite direction, from parent to child. The grant increases the
income-earning capacity of the child. In line with this, grants are added to
the wage income children earn when entering adulthood. Total adult income
(wage plus grants) is taxed on behalf of a compulsory pension of the pay-as-
you-go variety. So, the pension scheme is a collective scheme, redistributing
income from the present young (working) generation to the present old
(retired) generation, involving both families. Therefore, grants also imply an
intra-generational (inter-family) redistribution: a positive grant increases not
only one’s own pension, but also that of one’s contemporary in the other
family. As a result, a free-rider problem is involved: subjects might tend to
avoid inter-family redistribution by relying less on investments in children
and more on old age support if the tax rate increases. Unlike grants, supports
are purely intergenerational transfers, which do not interfere with the
pension system and leave the other family’s welfare untouched.
At the time an adult child decides about support to his or her parent, the
child has a wage income and the parent is in old age and has no wage
income. Support can then be used to smooth consumption across genera-
tions. One way in which a chain of intergenerational support could be
sustained is by means of indirect reciprocity. For example, the rule could be
to support the parent to the same extent that the parent supported her or his
parent. This type of quid pro quo was studied experimentally by Offerman,
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Verbon (1998) and found to receive only weak support. These studies,
however, were limited to a one-family context and did not allow for grants,
that is, transfers from parent to child.
As grants are taxed and used to ﬁnance the pension beneﬁt, a grant
automatically smoothes consumption to some extent. A grant raises the
child’s income and thereby the tax revenues and the collective pension
beneﬁt of his or her parent. However, as grants are only partly returned,
depending on the level of the tax rate, they are a (much) less effective
consumption-smoothing device than support. In addition to smoothing
consumption directly, however, a grant from parent to child may be used to
elicit old age support from child to parent later on. There is growing
evidence that direct reciprocity is important in many interactions; see Fehr
and Ga ¨chter (2000) for a survey. People tend to repay kindness with
kindness. In the present context the child could repay a grant with (old-age)
support.
The treatment variable in our experiments is the pension tax rate, which
can be low or high. This enables us to investigate the following questions:
Will grants or support be used mainly as an income-smoothing device? To
what extent will increasing government intervention crowd out voluntary
intergenerational transfers? Will grants be more or less affected than
support? What will be the net effect on welfare?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
introduce the underlying overlapping-generations model on which our
experimental study relies. The benchmark behavior as implied by perfect
and efﬁcient consumption smoothing as well as by pure selﬁshness is
derived. We also discuss our behavioral hypotheses. After describing the
experimental procedure in Section III, the results are presented in Section IV .
Concluding remarks in Section V summarize our major ﬁndings.
II. The Model Structure, Main Hypothesis and Related
Questions
In the overlapping-generations model that forms the basis for our experi-
ments we allow for two families. Each family consists of a sequence of
generations. One individual represents a generation of a family, and the
generations of each family partially overlap. Individuals live for two periods.
In the ﬁrst period, they receive a ﬁxed (labor) income Y, in the second period
they receive no ﬁxed labor income. Instead they receive a ﬂat pension
beneﬁt, ﬁnanced from contributions by the then young individuals, possibly
supplemented by a voluntary transfer from one’s successor. Payoffs to each
individual are equal to the product of the consumption levels in the ﬁrst and
second periods of one’s life. Hence, there is a strong incentive to try and
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distribution and the absence of a savings possibility, perfect consumption
smoothing can only be achieved by means of transfers.
In the ﬁrst period (when young) individuals make two decisions. First,
they decide how much of their income they wish to transfer to their parent
who is presently old. This amount is called the (old-age) support. Second,
they decide how much of their income they wish to invest in their child. This
investment is called the grant. Grants raise the child’s income in the next
period and thereby also the mandatory pension tax that is levied on this
income. Tax receipts from the young are distributed equally over the present
old generation. Hence, grants increase not only the income of one’s child,
but also one’s own pension beneﬁt and the pension beneﬁt of one’s
contemporary in the other family.
To introduce the notation, let index t refer to generations (t ¼ 1, ..., T),
and let index i refer to families (i ¼ 1, 2). We then deﬁne Gi
t(> 0) as the
grant that generation t of family i gives to generation t þ 1 of family i;
Si
t(> 0) as the support that generation t of family i gives to generation t   1
of family i; Ci
j,t, for j ¼ 1, 2, as the consumption level of generation t of
family i in the jth phase of life; ui
t as the payoff (or utility) of generation t of
family i; and Ptþ1 as the pension received by (all families of) generation t
when old.
The ﬂow diagram in Figure 1 describes the direction of the ﬂows of































Fig. 1. Flows of transfers within and between families
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paid by every individual when young are proportional to exogenous labor
income plus the grant received from one’s predecessor, while every old
individual receives a ﬂat pension beneﬁt. So, the PAYG system can lead to
redistribution between the two families.
The basic structural relationships are:





Consumption level of generation t of family i when young:
Ci
1,t ¼ (1   )[Y þ Gi
t 1]   Si
t   Gi
t (2)
Consumption level of family i of generation t when old:
Ci
2,t ¼ Si
tþ1 þ Ptþ1 (3)
Pension of every individual of generation t when old:
Ptþ1 ¼ [Y þ (G1
t þ G2
t)=2]: (4)
Here  with 0 ,  , 1 is the constant marginal tax rate, and Y is the wage
income earned while young (the wage income level of the old is set to 0).
The other variables have already been deﬁned above.
Equation (1) indicates that the payoff is equal to the product of the
consumption levels in the two periods of life. As equation (2) shows,
consumption when young is what remains after labor income and grants
(from the parent) are taxed and after support (to the parent) and grants (to
the child) are subtracted. Equation (3) indicates that consumption when old
is equal to the sum of the support received from the next generation (one’s
child) and the collective pension beneﬁt. Equation (4) deﬁnes the pay-as-
you-go pension. Incomes of both families of generation t þ 1, including the
grants, are taxed and redistributed equally over the two families of the
preceding generation (who are now old).
Starting from the above model, two benchmark outcomes naturally sug-
gest themselves. The ﬁrst is where no voluntary intergenerational linkages
exist. If future choices do not depend on present ones, then generation t of
family i has no incentive to support its parent, so the optimal decision is
Si
t ¼ 0 for i ¼ 1, 2 and t ¼ 1, 2, .... Anticipating this leaves only one
reason for a positive grant, namely consumption smoothing via the pension
system. By means of a positive grant Gi
t generation t of family i increases
592 W. Gu ¨th et al.
# The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2002.the income of generation t þ 1 of family i when young and thus the pension
Ptþ1, as deﬁned by (4), which generation t of family i receives when old. It
is easily veriﬁed,1 however, that this does not justify positive grants and,
hence, that every stationary and symmetric equilibrium implies Gi
t ¼ 0 for
i ¼ 1, 2 and t ¼ 1, 2, .... The intertemporal payoff in this case can be seen
to be equal to ui
t ¼ (1   )Y 2.
As an alternative benchmark we consider the most efﬁcient stationary
means of consumption smoothing, that is, Ci
1,t ¼ Ci
2,t. The intertemporal
payoff in this case can be seen to be equal to ui
t ¼ 0:25Y 2, which is larger
than the payoff for the non-cooperative outcome. Under the condition that
S ¼ Si
t and G ¼ Gi
t for i ¼ 1, 2 and t ¼ 1, 2, ..., perfect consumption
smoothing leads to the following condition in terms of G and S:
S þ G ¼ (1   2)Y=2: (5)
According to equation (5) there exists a continuum of (S, G)-constella-
tions allowing for efﬁcient stationary consumption smoothing. Note, more-
over, from (5) that for any value of  , 1, if subjects were to rely merely on
grants, these would need to take on much larger values than if they were to
rely on supports only.
The treatment variable used in our experimental study is the tax rate,
distinguished by two levels: the low tax rate  ¼ 0:05 and the high tax rate
 ¼ 0:25.
Our main hypothesis concerns the effect of the level of the public pension
scheme on the level of private transfers. It hypothesizes that more compul-
sory transfers, i.e., a larger tax rate, will crowd out voluntary transfers. The
main reason is that collective consumption smoothing is a perfect substitute
for private consumption smoothing.2 But this does not imply that private
transfers will be fully crowded out. This would only hold if realized levels of
private transfers are at their optimal level (equation (5)). Apart from the
crowding-out hypothesis, our experiment allows us to investigate a number
of related questions. We pose them as questions rather than hypotheses, since
arguments on either side of the issues can be advanced.
1The result follows from @ui
t=@Gt , 0 which, using Si
t ¼ 0, is equivalent to
(1   )Gi
t 1   G
j
t   Y(1 þ ) , 2Gi
t for j 6¼ i. Since, in a stationary equilibrium, we have
Gi
t 1 ¼ G
j
t, the condition simply requires  Y(1 þ ) , Gi
t(2 þ ) which holds for all grants
Gi
t > 0. Hence, Si
t ¼ 0, Gi
t ¼ 0 describes a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
2As noted in the Introduction, if altruism were the driving force behind both grants and
support, then we would expect an increase in grants to compensate the child for the higher tax
burden. However, support would deﬁnitely decrease as the old are better off with a higher
pension beneﬁt.
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support Si
t and grants Gi
t.
Related Questions: (a) Will the level of support exceed the level of grants?
(b) Will support or grants be more susceptible to crowding out? (c) Will the
higher tax rate lead to a higher or lower efﬁciency gain of voluntary
transfers?
The crowding-out hypothesis does not specify what will be used more,
grants or support. On the one hand, as noted above, support is more effective
as a means of smoothing consumption than grants. This suggests that levels
of support will be higher than those of grants. On the other hand, support is
directed towards the parent, who by deﬁnition cannot reciprocate. It is the
child who will have to reciprocate. Sustaining a consistent level of support
thus relies on indirect reciprocity, which may come less naturally to people
than direct reciprocity. The latter requires the use of grants. Moreover, an
advantage of a grant is that, even if it is not reciprocated by the child, it
automatically smooths the parent’s own consumption to some extent. A grant
raises the child’s income and thereby future tax revenues and one’s own old
age pension. There is always some direct positive feedback of a grant, which
is not true for support. So, it cannot be unambiguously hypothesized whether
the level of support will be higher or lower than the level of grants.
A similar prior ambiguity holds for the question of whether support or
grants will be affected most by an increase in the tax rate. As noted above,
due to the collective pension scheme, grants—contrary to support—lead to
some direct consumption smoothing. This direct beneﬁt, though not sufﬁ-
cient to make grants individually rational, increases with the tax rate. This
may mitigate the crowding-out effect of grants. At the same time, this same
feature may erode the force of direct reciprocity. It is now less clear that a
grant is intended to help the recipient (child) rather than the giver. The
potential force of indirect reciprocity is less affected by an increased tax
rate. Another feature which affects grants more than support is the free-rider
problem. The higher the tax rate, the higher the extent to which grants ‘‘leak
away’’ to the other family.
Finally, even though public transfers may crowd out private transfers, this
does not imply that a higher tax rate reduces the level of consumption
smoothing that is realized through private transfers. For one thing, with a
higher tax rate grants become more effective as a means of smoothing
consumption. To examine the net effect we compare realized efﬁciency gain,
Reff, deﬁnedas the increase inthe actual payoffover the payoff generated with
zerotransfers, expressed asa percentageof themaximalincreaseinpayoffs.
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In the experiment we relied on two families (i ¼ 1, 2) and sequences of ﬁve
generations (t ¼ 1, 2, ..., 5). The experiment was performed at Tilburg
University, The Netherlands, in December 1997. An announcement in the
university bulletin invited students to participate in a decision-making
experiment that would earn them money. Subjects were informed that there
were two families and a sequence of generations. The number of generations
and their place in the sequence was not revealed to the participants. To play
a sequence of rounds with two families and ﬁve generations, we would need
only 10 subjects. When conducting the experiment, however, we actually ran
two or three independent sessions at the same time. This prevented the
subjects from inferring the lengths of the queues from the number of subjects
present in the laboratory. Six sessions were run with tax treatment  (60
subjects) and ﬁve sessions were run with tax treatment  (50 subjects), giving
us 11 independent observations in total.
The decision variables of generation t ¼ 1, 2, ... of family i ¼ 1, 2 are
the variables Gi
t and Si
t, i.e., its grant and its support.3 The sum of these two
(non-negative) variables was restricted to be less than or equal to net income,
inclusive of grants received. In addition, each generation (t ¼ 1, 2, ...)o f
each family (i ¼ 1, 2) was also asked to specify its expectations concerning
Si
tþ1 as well as Ptþ1. That is, subjects were asked how much support they
expected to receive from their child and how much pension they expected to
receive from the collective scheme. When making decisions and specifying
expectations, generation t of family i was informed about the following
historical variables: Gi
t 1 (grant received from parent), Gt 2 (grant parent
received from grandparent), S i
t 1 (support by parent to grandparent) and
Ci
1,t 1 (consumption level of parent when young).4
In the experiment the ﬁxed gross income when young (Y) was set at 20.
Recall that tax rates in the two treatments were  ¼ 0:05 and  ¼ 0:25,
respectively. With grants (G) and support (S) equal to zero, this would give a
payoff (ui
t) of 19 (19 3 1) and 75 (15 3 5) in treatment  and , respectively.
Optimal consumption smoothing, on the other hand, would secure a payoff
of 100 (10 3 10) in either treatment.
Except for starting (t ¼ 0) and stopping (t ¼ 6) conditions,5 each genera-
tion (t ¼ 1, ..., 5) of every family i encountered the same type of situation.
3In the experiment we did not use expressions like parent, child or family but refered to
predecessors, successors, and queue.
4The last three of these variables could be retrieved only after a (registered) mouse click by the
participant.
5The relevant choices for the generation before the ﬁrst one (t ¼ 0) and the generation after
the last one (t ¼ 6) were predetermined by the experimenters (but not revealed to the subjects).
The starting and stopping values that we used are: Gi
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families as a round. To allow for learning, subjects played ﬁve or six
successive rounds. At the beginning of a round, subjects were randomly
(re)assigned to a family and a generation. This minimizes repeated game
effects. Although repeated game effects and the possibility of punishment
may play a role in many family decisions, as in Peters, U ¨nu ¨r, Clark and
Schulze (1999), grants and old age support are to a large extent once-only
decisions. Once you decide not to support your parents when old, there is no
second chance. In the experiment we wanted to retain this feature.
The sequence of events for a subject in a round is as follows: (0) waiting
screen; (1) screen lights up, giving historical information (see above), and
asking for decisions about support and grant; (2) after decisions are entered,
subject is asked to state expectations regarding support and pension; (3) as
soon as the next generation has made its decisions, a screen lights up with
support and pension received, and the corresponding earnings; (4) after
conﬁrmation the round ends and the waiting screen for the next round
appears.
We anticipated that the subjects would ﬁnd the experiment rather compli-
cated. Therefore, we made sure that the subjects had plenty of time to go
through the instructions, ask questions and practice with the time structure
of the game and the relation between decisions and payoffs. In total, sessions
lasted between 21
2 and 3 hours. About 11
2 hours was reserved for instructions,
questions and individual practice. As indicated by a post-experimental ques-
tionnaire and conversations with subjects, we were successful in explaining
the game to the subjects; 93 percent stated that the instructions were clear.
IV. Experimental Results
Main Hypotheses and Related Questions
Table 1 reports the average levels of transfers, the corresponding payoffs and
the realized efﬁciency levels. The bottom row gives signiﬁcance levels of
Mann–Whitney tests of the difference between the two treatments (with the
Table 1. Average levels of grants G, support S, realized payoff u, and
efﬁciency Reff
GSu R eff
 3.90 1.53 50.9 39.4%
 2.19 1.01 92.8 71.7%
p-values 0.004 0.117 0.004 0.004
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esis, we ﬁnd that forced redistribution by a system of higher taxes leads to
lower levels of grants and supports. Crowding out is far from complete,
however. The higher tax rate increases forced redistribution (P ¼ Y ) from
1 to 5. The reduction in private transfers is much smaller than that.
Crowding-out Hypothesis: In comparison with the low tax treatment, the
high tax treatment yields lower levels of grants and support. Crowding out is
less than complete, however.
Table 1 also allows us to answer the three related questions.
Related Questions. (a) In both tax treatments, the average level of grants is
signiﬁcantly higher than the average level of support.6 (b) The degree of
crowding out is larger for grants (44 percent) than for support (33 percent).
Furthermore, the decrease in grants is statistically signiﬁcant (p ¼ 0:004),
whereas the decrease in support is not (p ¼ 0:117). (c) The realized
efﬁciency level is signiﬁcantly higher in the high tax treatment (71.7 percent)
than in the low tax treatment (39.4 percent).7
Table 1 indicates that in both the low and the high tax treatment, the
average level of grants is higher than the average level of support. There is a
tendency for the subjects to rely on grants even though grants are a less
effective tool for smoothing consumption. At the same time, we see that the
crowding-out effect is larger for grants than for support. Support is more
immune to government intervention than grants. This must be due to the
combined effect of the free-rider problem and the decreasing importance of
grants as a token of direct reciprocity. Support is less affected, suggesting
that the relative importance of indirect reciprocity has increased under the
high tax rate treatment. We return to this below. Furthermore, both these
effects suggest that altruism is not a driving force behind the transfers.
Realized efﬁciency gain due to private transfers is lower in the low tax
treatment than in the high tax treatment. Even though a higher tax leads to
lower levels of private transfers, these transfers realize a larger efﬁciency
gain. This is due to the fact that with a higher tax rate, grants become more
effective as an income-smoothing device.
6With a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test and session averages as observations, the
difference is signiﬁcant at p ¼ 0:03 in the low tax treatment and at p ¼ 0:04 in the high tax
treatment.
7The average actual payoff of 92.8 (50.9) per subject per round in the high tax (low tax)
treatment implies that given a maximum payoff of 100 under efﬁcient consumption smoothing,
71.7 percent (39.4 percent) of the potential gain is realized (i.e., 17.8 out of 25 and 31.9 out of
81, respectively).
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The foregoing analysis abstracts from the dynamics of the transfers over
time. The actual dynamics are illustrated graphically by Figure 2, which lists
the time sequence of the average support and grants in the natural time order
(starting with generations t ¼ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 of round 1, then of round 2, etc.).
What emerges from Figure 2 is that in the low tax treatment, grants and
support are relatively stable. In the high tax treatment there is a slight erosion
of both support and grants. In addition, over time, grants are unambiguously
larger in the low tax treatment than in the high tax treatment, while this does
not hold for support. In some rounds, support is higher in the high tax
treatment than in the low tax treatment. Furthermore, the average levels of
grants and support do not display any trend within a round. That is, the
average level of transfers is more or less the same for the ﬁrst, second, third,
fourth or ﬁfth generation within a family.8
As regards the reported beliefs about how much support they expected to
receive from their successor, in the low (high) tax treatment subjects on
average expect to receive ^ S Si
tþ1 ¼ 2:53 (1.85), while in fact they receive only
Si
t ¼ 1:53 (1.01). Subjects are clearly too optimistic about the support to be
received. These results also imply that participants on average give less
support to their predecessor than what they expect to receive from their
successor.
Table 2 gives Tobit estimation9 results on how the level of support Si
t is
related to the level of grants Gi
t 1 and support Si
t 1 of the predecessor. These
relations are hypothesized to measure direct and indirect reciprocity, respec-
tively. As an additional explanatory variable, the support expected from the
successor in the same family (^ S Si
tþ1) is included. This is hypothesized to
measure ‘‘anticipated reciprocity’’, under which participants are motivated
to match the support they expect to receive from their successors; cf. Sugden
(1984). Similar behavioral relations are estimated for the level of grants Gi
t,
though the (theoretical) arguments for these relations are weaker than for
support.
8This also suggests that predetermining some of the values in the experiment (see footnote 5)
did not have much of an effect the levels of transfers.
9Tobit estimation was used as relatively many observations of the dependent variables are
zeros. This holds especially for support in the high-tax treament, where 50 percent of the cases
involve a transfer of S ¼ 0. This implies that a linear relationship is not reasonable and that
the truncation of the observations at the lower bound of zero should be taken seriously. In any
case, we do not wish to place too much emphasis on the estimation results. The regressions
assume independence of all observations, which is not satisﬁed according to the most rigorous
standards (only session aggregates can be assumed to be independent). Moreover, there may be
simultaneity in the decisions about the S and G, which the Tobit procedure does not take into
account. Nevertheless, the estimations yield some interesting results which are indicative of
the behavioral regularities in participants’ choices.
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received (Gi
t 1) appears to have very little impact on the support supplied
(Si
t): while in the low tax treatment some weakly signiﬁcant effect can be






































Fig. 2. The dynamics of average support and grants
Table 2. Tobit maximum likelihood results for supports Si





   
Constant  10.65 ( 2.14)  779.57 ( 4.00) 2.80 (6.53)  5.53 ( 2.12)
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02
Gi
t 1 0.44 (1.51) 16.54 (1.01)  0.00 ( 0.02) 0.58 (2.14)
0.07 0.16 0.49 0.02
Si
t 1 0.48 (1.37) 105.62 (3.58)  0.21 ( 2.10) 0.83 (2.50)
0.09 0.00 0.02 0.01
^ S Si
tþ1 1.16 (3.31) 8.93 (2.62) 0.39 (5.03) 0.01 (0.12)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45
 3.70 (4.86) 21.04 (7.05) 2.25 (16.19) 3.48 (6.33)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 logL 397.94 267.01 537.61 569.09
Obs. 262 174 262 174
Note: Estimate standard error in parentheses; p-value in italics; for Si
t 1 we only considered the cases
where the former decision was actually looked at by mouse click, which was in 73 percent (64
percent) of the cases in low (high) tax treatment.
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predecessors with more support when they receive a higher grant. So,
although grants are generally larger than support, they do not appear to be
very effective as a device for eliciting support.
Second, the strongest signs of indirect reciprocity are in the high tax
treatment. Here we ﬁnd that the support given to the predecessor (Si
t)i s
positively and signiﬁcantly affected by the support given by the predecessor
(Si
t 1). For the low tax treatment, however, no such relationship is found.
This is in line with our result, established earlier, that participants concen-
trate relatively more on support in the high tax treatment. To achieve this
they rely more on indirect reciprocity.
Finally, the support expected from the successor (^ S Si
tþ1) has a signiﬁcant
impact on the support given to the predecessor (Si
t) in both the low and the
high tax treatment. This suggests that subjects to some extent wish to match
the support they expect to receive. For grants, Gi
t, the expected support is of
importance in the low tax treatment only. This is in line with our earlier
conclusion that in the high tax treatment, direct reciprocity will be of less
importance than in the low tax treatment.
V. Concluding Discussion
In our two-family experiment we have allowed for intergenerational transfers
in both directions, i.e., from parent to child, by so-called grants, and from
child to parent, by so-called (old-age) support. A compulsory transfer system
taxed income of the adults in both families proportionally and transferred
the receipts to the old aged of both families in a lump-sum fashion. We
implemented a high tax treatment and a low tax treatment. It was hypothe-
sized that a large compulsory tax system would erode voluntary intergenera-
tional transfers (crowding-out hypothesis).
The experimental data were by and large in line with the crowding-out
hypothesis. In the high tax treatment, lower levels of grants and support were
observed. However, only the difference in grants reached a statistically
signiﬁcant level; crowding out was stronger for grants than for support.
Furthermore, in spite of the crowding-out effect, the efﬁciency of private
transfers increased due to the tax increase, and the net effect was clearly
positive.
The crowding out of support was not dollar-for-dollar, and grants did not
increase, which forcefully suggests that altruism is not the main motive for
the private transfers in our experiment. Given the possibility of two-way
transfers in our experiments, (at least) two forms of reciprocity could
motivate private transfers. One possibility is that subjects provide support
conditional on the support provided by their predecessor, i.e., indirect
reciprocity. Another possibility is that individuals provide support condi-
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less efﬁcient device for consumption smoothing in our model. Subjects
nevertheless did give signiﬁcantly larger grants than support. This suggests
that subjects tend to have considerable conﬁdence in grants as a mechanism
for eliciting support.10
We did not ﬁnd much evidence of direct reciprocity, however, and
evidence of indirect reciprocity is conﬁned to the high tax treatment. This
seems to contradict results from other experiments which do ﬁnd recipro-
city; see Fehr and Ga ¨chter (2000) for a recent survey and Seinen and
Schram (2000) for evidence of indirect reciprocity. It should be noted,
however, that our experiment is more complicated than many others. For
example, in many experiments there is only one way to realize gains from
cooperation. In our experiment there are many ways to realize such gains.
Apart from a cooperation problem there also is a coordination problem. In
a more complex environment, acts of kindness are more difﬁcult to ‘‘read’’
and the proper (reciprocal) way to respond to such acts is less straightfor-
ward. This does not imply that behavior becomes random; after all, we ﬁnd
some clear and interpretable treatment effects. Since there are different
ways to be kind and to support cooperation, however, there is more chance
that kind acts are misunderstood and that signs of reciprocity are difﬁcult
to detect.11
Experiments such as ours provide detailed information on individual
behavior and make it possible to isolate the effect of key variables. This
paper demonstrates the potential of experimental methods for studying
impact of social-security systems on family-based choices. Obviously, as
our subjects were students, altruistic motives derived from kinship did not
motivate transfer behavior in the experiments. Our study appears to be
more in line with the concept of a family as a unit where ‘‘family
contracts’’ are conducted ‘‘without altruism’’; cf. Cigno (1993). We have
shown that in the absence of kinship, transfers in a ‘‘family-like’’ context
may emerge just as well. Interestingly, in our experiment, we ﬁnd that the
use of grants dominates the use of support, that is, more money ﬂows
from ‘‘parent’’ to ‘‘child’’ than vice versa. Such grant dominance is also
found in ﬁeld data, and one might be inclined to relate this to ‘‘asym-
metric altruism’’ where parents care more for their children than vice
10From a post-experimental questionnaire we found that subjects on average expect to beneﬁt
more from giving a grant than from giving support. At the same time they believe support to
be fairer than grants.
11Van der Heijden, Nelissen, Potters and Verbon (2001) drew a similar conclusion based on a
gift exchange experiment in which there were different cooperative outcomes.
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asymmetric altruism and kinship-related motives are not necessary to




The choices that you make, when it is your turn, affect your own earnings. Your
choices also affect the earnings of the participant before you in the row of your group
(your predecessor) and the earnings of the participant after you in the row of your
group (your successor). Furthermore, your choices affect the earnings of the
participant in the other group who makes her or his choices at the same time as you
do (your contemporary). Conversely, the choices of your predecessor, your successor
and your contemporary affect your earnings.
The stage in which you make your choices is called the active stage. After the
active stage there is a passive stage. You make two choices during the active stage
just like every other participant. First, you decide whether or not you want to give a
grant [transfer] to your successor in your group. Second, you decide whether or not
you want to give support [overdracht] to your predecessor.
At the beginning of the active stage you get a starting endowment of 20 points. If
your predecessor in your group has decided to give you a grant, then your starting
endowment [startbezit] is supplemented with this grant. Note that you are the
successor of your predecessor, so you receive the grant determined by your
predecessor. The resulting amount will be called your gross endowment [bruto bezit].
From your gross endowment you must pay a contribution [afdracht] of 5 percent.
Your contemporary in the other group will also contribute 5 percent of her or his
gross endowment. This is done to make a general payment to your predecessor and
the predecessor of your contemporary. If you subtract your contribution from your
gross endowment, you get your net endowment [netto bezit].
Then you can make your decisions. First, you can give a grant to your successor.
Second, you can give support to your predecessor. Then follows the passive stage in
which you do not make decisions. In the passive stage you may receive two amounts.
First, it is possible that your successor will give support to you. Second, you as well
as your contemporary receive a general payment out of the contributions by your
successor and the successor of your contemporary.
12A full version of the instructions and other material of relevance to the experiment can be
found in an earlier working-paper version; see: http://greywww.kub.nl:2080/greyﬁles/center/
2000/54.html.
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